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Abstract: This essay presents an experimental 
theory of values. An abstract schema is extracted 
from two pairs of concepts that are used in moral 
evaluation, good and bad, on the one hand, and 
right and wrong on the other. The schema is then 
used to explore the analogues of the moral 
concepts in aesthetic and epistemic evaluation. 
 Resumen: Este ensayo presenta una teoría 
experimental de los valores. Se extrae un 
esquema de dos pares de conceptos que se 
utilizan en la evaluación moral: bueno y malo, 
por un lado, y correcto e incorrecto por el otro. 
El esquema se usa luego para explorar los 
análogos de los conceptos morales en la 
evaluación estética y epistémica. 
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As for willing, it is equally plausible that it is justified by valuing. If one were asked 
why one wanted genocide and the raping of babies stopped and prevented in all 
possible ways, the answer would probably begin with the assertion that such things 
are evil, that is, extremely negatively valued actions on animate beings. However, 
this question is only a beginning since few philosophers would fail to find that another 
question immediately arises: namely, the question of what justifies this negative 
valuing […] One might contend that it is once again evidencing that justifies valuing.1  
In the passage above, Lester Embree asks a question and a gives hint at the 
answer. Below, in the first part about moral evaluation I say some things that 
 
1 Lester Embree, “Extremely Bad Things: Some Reflective Analysis of Valuation”, in Lester Embree & 
Michael Barber, The Golden Age of Phenomenology at the New School for Social Research, 1954-1973 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), pp. 319f. 
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elaborate his answer. My overall intention here is to go beyond moral evaluation 
and to present a schema for exploring some similarities between the moral and 
two other areas of evaluation, the epistemic and the aesthetic, and to begin that 
exploration. 
I will first take two sets of terms that are common in moral evaluation and 
use them in a way to form two distinct and related dimensions of evaluation, 
from which I will then extract an abstract framework of relationships (hereafter 
referred to as the “schema”) and apply that to the two other areas. I will explore 
the implications and advantages of this framework in all three of the value areas. 
It is in these implications and advantages where I see the merits of the schema, 
and I offer these merits as support for the schema. So, in setting out the ideas 
about moral evaluation, I will give stipulative definitions and will not be claiming 
that the concepts tell the truth about moral evaluation.  
MORAL EVALUATION 
“Good” and “bad”, “right” and “wrong” are terms commonly used in moral 
evaluation2. They have various meanings, however. For example, sometimes 
“right” and “good” are used synonymously and sometimes they are used with 
different meanings. I am going to use these terms to name four distinct concepts. 
In order to do so, I will pick four distinct meanings that these terms have had 
and further specify those meanings in a particular way. 
“Good” and “bad” are terms that are used to express positive and negative 
moral value. I will use them exclusively to evaluate objects and states of affairs 
that come about by human action, and not, as is sometimes done, to judge a 
person because of what they do, or to judge an action that a person performs. 
So, for example, if a person does something that causes the death of another 
person, they have brought about something that has negative moral value, 
something “bad”. We can then say to the person “you did something bad”, but 
not “your doing that was bad”, or “you are a bad person”. Also, in the way I am 
using the terms “good” and “bad”, they express the value of something because 
of what it is, and not because of its relation to anything else. They are intrinsic 
values. This means that the value is independent of anything about or 
 
2 Here and below I will be using only two terms for the positive and negative values, not meaning to 
imply that there are not shades of value and many terms.  
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surrounding the action that brought it about. In our example, the death is bad 
regardless of the circumstances in which the act causing it was performed, or the 
intention of the actor in performing the act, or any other matter concerning the 
person or action. On the other hand, if someone saves a person who otherwise 
would be murdered, they have brought about a “good” result, regardless of such 
things as the actual intentions of the person doing the saving, the identity of the 
person saved, etc. 
Whereas “good” and “bad” concern what is brought about by a person’s 
action, the terms “right” and “wrong”, express the positive or negative value of 
the action, i.e. the person’s bringing about  of the state of affairs. These values 
are not intrinsic to an action but depend on various kinds of factors outside of 
the action itself such as the circumstances in which the act was performed, the 
intention of the actor in performing it, the identity of any person who is affected 
by the action, etc... So, for example, while it is bad to bring about the death of 
a person, it could be considered “right” if that person was Adolf Hitler during the 
early 1940’s.  
Now, right and good “line up”, as do wrong and bad, for normally it is right 
to perform an act that brings about a result having positive moral value and 
wrong to perform one that brings about a result with negative moral value: “do 
good; avoid evil”. They line up because the positive or negative moral value of 
the state of affairs brought about by an action bestows it’s moral value on the 
act that brought it about. But this bestowal does not go the other way, from the 
value of the action to the value of the state of affairs brought about by it. Because 
good and bad are intrinsic features of a state of affairs, the rightness or 
wrongness of an act does not affect its moral value. If in a particular case it is 
right to do something bad, the rightness does not affect the badness of the result, 
as in the case of the example of Hitler. It stays bad. Similarly if it is wrong to do 
something good, the wrongness in the first case does not affect the goodness of 
the result, which stays good. These are what I will call “crossover” cases, which 
I will now discuss. 
“Crossover cases” are cases where right and good, wrong and bad do not line 
up. It is where “right” goes with “bad”, and where “wrong” goes with “good”. In 
these crossover cases, such things as the circumstances in which an act was 
performed, the intentions of the person in performing it, or the identity of the 
recipient of the action, can act to outweigh the value coming from the result and 
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thus justify an evaluation that is the opposite of that value. An action that 
produces a state of affairs that has negative moral value can then be “right”. It 
would be “right” because the performance of the act was justified; the reasons 
for performing the act outweighed the negative moral value that the result 
bestows on the act. Likewise, an act that produces something of positive value 
could be wrong if factors were present that outweighed the positive value 
emanating from the resulting state of affairs. Let me explain and elaborate more 
by using an example.  
First I will present a case where the values line up. When I was a high school 
teenager I had a friend who hunted animals. His family had guns and a hunting 
dog. One day he invited me to go with him to hunt rabbits. This was the first time 
I ever went hunting. He loaned me a double barrel shotgun. We were standing 
in a clearing surrounded by woods when the dog chased a rabbit in front of me, 
about 50 feet away. I aimed and pulled the trigger. The rabbit was hit and flew 
up in the air and then down on its back where it was moving its legs as if 
struggling for its life. I became overcome with emotion seeing this; I was 
frightened and I wanted the movement to stop immediately, so I shot again and 
the movement stopped. Then a thought came to me: “Bill, you have just messed 
around with something (life) that you should not be messing with”. Here the bad 
result and the wrongness line up. 
Now I will present a crossover case. This is a case, reported years ago in the 
newspapers, of an elderly man, Woody Collums, who shot and killed his brother 
who was suffering from dementia. Quoting from a news article, the brother  
lay helpless in his bed at a nursing home, his brain cells degenerating, unable to 
speak or to care for himself, kept alive by nutrients flowing through a tube that ran 
through his nose and into his stomach as he slid inexorably toward death. That is 
when Woody Collums says he took matters into his own hands. “I just couldn’t leave 
him like that”, he said later in a quavering voice. So, after a moment’s indecision, he 
pumped three .38–caliber pistol shots into his abdomen, “just as fast as I could”.… 
Mr. Collums says he has no regrets and would “absolutely” do it again “to get him 
out of his misery”.3  
 
3 The New York Times, 12/10/1981. 
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Mr. Collums was indicted for his act and pleaded guilty. At one of his legal 
hearings he said “I regret having to do what I did, but I don’t regret doing it”4.  
In terms of the concepts I am using here, Mr. Collums thought that it was 
right to do what he did, because it was justified, and he recognized that what he 
did was something bad.  
There are two things about this story and the one about me and the rabbit 
that will help me clarify further and advance the ideas I am presenting. First, in 
my story the badness is experienced by an emotion, the fear I felt.  I think that 
the same was involved in the case of Woody Collums. I understand his shooting 
“just as fast as I could” to be like my shooting to stop the rabbit’s movement 
“immediately”. Both were attempts to limit negative emotion, in my case the 
emotion that I was feeling, and in his case an emotion that he knew he would be 
about to feel. In the theory I am presenting, feeling and emotion are the primary 
ways of experiencing value. This does not mean that everyone, or someone on 
every occasion, will experience value in this way, but I think that the value aspect 
of the world is originally experienced by feeling and emotion. It is appropriate to 
have a negative emotion if the consequences of one’s act are bad, even if 
performing the act is right. The scheme validates this, and I think this is one of 
its advantages. What if one does not have such feelings? You do things that have 
bad results and you feel nothing, for example. Well, this is not appropriate. The 
scheme points to the need for education in moral perception. We know that in 
many areas of experience, one needs to learn how to perceive what is there. 
Experiencing food and wine are examples of this that most people are familiar 
with, where some training is needed to detect flavors. We would have to develop 
ways of sensitizing people to the bad and the good. In many cases, of course, 
this seems to come naturally. When I was a young child, someone in my family 
accused me of doing something I did not do. This was the first time this happened 
to me and I was spontaneously overcome by a feeling of being offended and, 
because of this feeling, I said to myself “I will never do that to anyone”. Soldiers 
in war know all about feeling and emotion in experiencing the bad.  
Second, and this is apparent in Woody Collums’s story, there is no need to 
feel guilt after performing an act that has bad consequences but is the right thing 
to do, or no need to think you are a hypocrite for recognizing the badness and 
 
4 The New York Times, 02/06/1982. 
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not feeling guilt. In saying “I regret having to do what I did, but I don’t regret 
doing it”, Mr. Collums showed that he understood what I take to be an important 
implication of the independence in the crossover cases, namely, that the 
rightness of an action does not affect any badness of its result. It stays bad, and 
“regret” is a feeling that is called for in cases like this. One advantage of the 
feeling of regret is that it promotes caution and circumspection in doing things 
that bring about bad results. The same advantage of caution and circumspection 
is true in a different way in the second kind of crossover case, where a good 
result comes about through a wrong action. I will leave it to the reader to think 
of an example of this and to determine where the “regret” should be aimed.  
Another advantage of the ideas that I am presenting is that they may help 
settle or at least clarify some disputes about morality. To take a new example, 
let us say that in certain cases the result of having an abortion is bad; it ends a 
“human life”. But there may be reasons that justify having an abortion and thus 
make it right. I think that in some disputes about abortion the side that wants to 
forbid it is focused on the badness of the result and the other side is focused on 
the rightness–but neither side realizes that they are focused on separate things 
that require, according to my scheme, separate discussions. In some disputes 
about a particular abortion one side that is emphasizing the badness of the result 
may be thinking that it forbids the act. The other side may emphasize the 
rightness of having the abortion, thinking that this takes away the badness of 
the result. They would be deadlocked. Disputes like these can at least be clarified 
if both sides adopt the scheme I am proposing. Then the disputes will no longer 
be so intransigent. If both adopt the account of the crossover cases, both can 
agree about the badness, and then turn to arguing about the justification. Both 
can feel regret that the abortion had to be done, an appropriate feeling that can 
prevent unjustified acts, but not one that changes how one thinks about the 
rightness of the act.  
To sum up where we are thus far in abstract terms, I have presented a 
schema for evaluating value that has four components: 
1) Some objects or state of affairs that can have intrinsic positive or negative 
value properties; 
2) A way that a person can experience the value properties; 
3) A way that a person is dynamically related to the object or state of affairs; 
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4) Positive and negative judgments of the way of being related. 
The scheme has two pairs of evaluative concepts, one pair for the value 
properties of the object or state of affairs, and another pair for the evaluation of 
the way the person is dynamically related to these.  
Now comes the more exploratory part of this paper. Here I invite the reader 
to participate in applying this scheme in an experimental way to two other value 
areas, the aesthetic and the epistemic (another area of application could be the 
practical–with useful/useless). We will use the schema above and try to identify 




Some objects or states of affairs that can have intrinsic positive or negative 
value properties: 
It would seem that the analogues of good and bad, in the case of fine art, 
are beautiful and ugly. For music we need a different term for negative value 
because “ugly” does not fit. “Bad” is often used5.  
 
A way that a person can experience the value properties: 
Various forms of aesthetic feeling would be the way that a person would 
experience the aesthetic value of something, for instance, the feeling of awe in 
seeing a beautiful natural landscape, or of disgust when encountering a very ugly 
person.  
A way that a person is dynamically related to the object or state of affairs: 
The analogues in the aesthetic sphere of a person’s action in the moral sphere 
(do good, avoid evil) would seem to be various kinds of attraction (“move 
towards”) and repulsion (“move away from”). I have an example from my own 
life. I am in my study reading and writing and some classical music is playing on 
the radio in the background. As I concentrate on my work, some unusually 
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and turn my attention toward it and stay fixated on it (it was Beniamino Gigli 
singing “Mamma”). Or, on another occasion, some music that is annoying me 
intrudes on my attention and I cannot stand it, so I get up and turn off the radio.  
Positive and negative judgments of the way of being related: 
In the cases above, things “line up”. What words shall we use to name the 
judgments that are analogous to right and wrong in the moral sphere? We need 
to fill in this formula: It is ‘X’ to move towards the beautiful”, and ‘Y’ to move 
away from the ugly. X is perhaps “tasteful”, where “tasteful” means “showing 
good aesthetic judgment or appropriate behavior”6.   And Y?  
What about crossover cases. Here is where things get interesting to think 
about, as we will be on unchartered territory. We seek terms that express 
evaluations where the context provides something analogous to justification for 
what otherwise would be an incorrect evaluation. For example, suppose someone 
is attracted, rather than repulsed, by a person who is extremely ugly. Where 
things line up we would say “it is perverse to be attracted toward the ugly”, where 
“perverse” would be the analogue of “wrong”. But this would be an incorrect 
evaluation if the context provided overriding justification for the behavior. What 
might justify moving one’s attention toward a person with a physical deformity 
that makes them ugly? Or the same question about the posture of the slain on 
the battlefield in war. In the case of moral evaluation, justification as discussed 
above consisted of positive factors outweighing (but not cancelling) the negativity 
emanating from the bad. What would be analogous to this in the case of aesthetic 
evaluation? Perhaps this: the moving toward of one’s attention could take the 
form of a certain fascination with the unusualness and uniqueness of the 
configuration of the ugly. The analogue of “right” here could be “generous”, and 
the person exhibiting this willingness to see something positive in something that 
nonetheless remains ugly, could say (analogous to expressing regret): I don’t 
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Here too, I will leave it up to the reader to think of the other kind of crossover 
case, where a negative evaluation would be justified for an attraction to 
something beautiful. 
EPISTEMIC EVALUATION 
Something that can have intrinsic positive or negative value properties: 
Within the knowledge sphere it is statements that have value, as true or 
false, which are then the analogues of good and bad. Can we say, though, that 
truth and falsity are intrinsic properties of statements? After all, one theory has 
it that the truth or falsity comes to a statement from its “correspondence with 
reality”, and so is dependent on something outside of itself (at least in the case 
of many types of statements). While this seems to make these value properties 
different from the previous ones, there is nonetheless enough independence from 
some other factors to make applying my schema to epistemic value an interesting 
discussion, other factors such as the strength of someone’s belief in a statement, 
the statement’s relation to other statements, the authoritative status of someone 
who endorses the statement, or the value that belief in the statement may have 
for the person who believes it. 
A way that a person can experience the value properties: 
People have an original experience of truth and falsity when they reflect on 
the experiences of confirmation and disconfirmation of beliefs that they have 
(working here with the Correspondence Concept of truth).  
A way that a person is dynamically related to the object or state of affairs: 
This would be believing or disbelieving the statement. To believe a statement 
is to relate oneself to it in a giving of assent to it and to disbelieve it is to reject 
it.  
Positive and negative judgments of the way of being related: 
“Rational” and “irrational” would be terms that can be used to evaluate 
believing. These are the counterparts of right and wrong.  
In the cases where the values line up, it is rational to believe what you know 
to be true, and irrational (or hypocritical?) to believe what you know to be false. 
But can it be positively valued to believe what you know to be false (a crossover 
case)? Or, could it be wise to refuse to face reality and disbelieve what you know 
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to be true? What would not be an example of what we are looking for is when 
you say “S is P is false” but act as it you believe it is true, where your saying is 
actually a lie. This is not even hypocrisy.  Then there is this case: We know that 
S is P is false, but we want it to be true. Our desire may lead us to “forget” that 
we know it is false. But this is self-deception and seems not to be praiseworthy.  
A good crossover case may be where one knows that S is P is false from a 
correspondence point of view and does not doubt that, but, nonetheless believes 
that S is P because doing so brings positive value to their life7. This does not need 
to be “refusing to face reality”, which would seem to call for negative evaluation. 
One could very well disbelieve that certain statements correspond with reality, 
but nonetheless give one’s assent to them in another sense. Could it not be a 
positive thing for a person to live their life as if certain things about themselves 
or their situation were not true? Here “assent” amounts to conducting oneself 
according to certain ideas that one does not believe are true in the 
correspondence sense.  
Again, I let the reader take over from here and explore the possibilities and 
the advantages of the schema. 
 
 
7 This is like the concept of pragmatic truth. 
